hare

gcm.ha (6642B)

---

 // SPDX-License-Identifier: MPL-2.0
 // (c) Hare authors <https://harelang.org>
 
 use bytes;
 use crypto::math::{xor,eqslice};
 use endian::{beputu64, beputu32, begetu32};
 use errors;
 use io;
 use types;
 
 def GCMBLOCKSZ: size = 16;
 
 export def GCMTAGSZ: size = 16;
 
 export type gcmstream = struct {
 	stream: io::stream,
 	block: nullable *block,
 	handle: io::handle,
 	tagbuf: [GCMBLOCKSZ]u8,
 	xorbuf: [GCMBLOCKSZ]u8,
 	cipherbuf: [GCMBLOCKSZ]u8,
 	y0: [GCMBLOCKSZ]u8,
 	h: [GCMBLOCKSZ]u8,
 	y: u32,
 	xorbufpos: size,
 	adlen: u64,
 	clen: u64,
 };
 
 const gcm_vtable: io::vtable = io::vtable {
 	writer = &gcm_writer,
 	reader = &gcm_reader,
 	closer = &gcm_closer,
 	...
 };
 
 // Creates a Galois Counter Mode (GCM) io::stream which can be used for
 // encryption (by encrypting writes to the underlying handle) or decryption (or
 // by decrypting reads from the underlying handle), but not both. [[gcm_init]]
 // must be called to initialize the stream, before reading or writing. To
 // authenticate the encrypted data an authentication tag must be created using
 // [[gcm_seal]] after the encryption step. The authentication tag must be passed
 // to [[gcm_verify]] after decryption to make sure that the encrypted and
 // additional data were not modified. In case of a verification fail the
 // decrypted data must not be trusted and hence discarded.
 //
 // A maximum of 2**36-32 bytes may be encrypted.
 //
 // The user must call [[io::close]] when they are done using the stream to
 // securely erase secret information stored in the stream state. Close will
 // also finish the 'block' provided by [[gcm_init]]. If the 'block' should
 // not be finished, [[gcm_unlink_block]] must be called before close.
 export fn gcm() gcmstream = {
 	return gcmstream {
 		stream = &gcm_vtable,
 		handle = 0,
 		...
 	};
 };
 
 // Initialises the gcmstream. The data will be encrypted to or encrypted from
 // the given 'handle' The implementation only supports a block cipher 'b' with a
 // block size of 16 bytes. The initialization vector (nonce) 'iv' may have any
 // size up to 2**61 bytes. 12 bytes is the recommended size, if efficiency is
 // critical. The additional data 'ad' will be authenticated but not encrypted
 // and may have a maximum length of 2**61 - 1 bytes. 'ad' will not be written to
 // the underlying handle.
 export fn gcm_init(
 	s: *gcmstream,
 	handle: io::handle,
 	b: *block,
 	iv: const []u8,
 	ad: const []u8
 ) void = {
 	assert(blocksz(b) == GCMBLOCKSZ);
 	assert(len(iv): u64 <= (types::U64_MAX >> 3));
 
 	s.handle = handle;
 	s.block = b;
 	s.adlen = len(ad);
 	s.xorbufpos = GCMBLOCKSZ; // to force fill xorbuf at start
 
 	encrypt(b, s.h, s.h);
 
 	if (len(iv) == 12) {
 		s.y0[..12] = iv[..];
 		s.y0[15] |= 1;
 	} else {
 		let ivlen = s.tagbuf;
 		beputu64(ivlen[8..], len(iv) << 3);
 		ghash_ctmul64(s.y0, s.h, iv);
 		ghash_ctmul64(s.y0, s.h, ivlen);
 		bytes::zero(ivlen);
 	};
 
 	s.y = begetu32(s.y0[12..]) + 1;
 
 	let ad = ad[..];
 	for (len(ad) > 0) {
 		const max = if (len(ad) >= GCMBLOCKSZ) {
 			yield GCMBLOCKSZ;
 		} else {
 			yield len(ad);
 		};
 
 		ghash_ctmul64(s.tagbuf, s.h, ad[..max]);
 		ad = ad[max..];
 	};
 };
 
 fn gcm_writer(s: *io::stream, buf: const []u8) (size | io::error) = {
 	let s = s: *gcmstream;
 	if (len(buf) == 0) {
 		return 0z;
 	};
 
 	if (s.xorbufpos == GCMBLOCKSZ) {
 		// current key block is depleted, prepare the next one
 		fillxorbuf(s);
 	};
 
 	let buf = buf[..];
 
 	let n: size = 0;
 	const max = if (s.xorbufpos + len(buf) > len(s.cipherbuf)) {
 		yield len(s.cipherbuf) - s.xorbufpos;
 	} else {
 		yield len(buf);
 	};
 
 	let cipher = s.cipherbuf[s.xorbufpos..s.xorbufpos + max];
 	let key = s.xorbuf[s.xorbufpos..s.xorbufpos + max];
 	xor(cipher, key, buf[..max]);
 
 	const n = io::write(s.handle, cipher)?;
 	s.xorbufpos += n;
 	s.clen += n;
 
 	if (s.xorbufpos == GCMBLOCKSZ) {
 		ghash_ctmul64(s.tagbuf, s.h, s.cipherbuf);
 	};
 
 	return n;
 };
 
 fn fillxorbuf(s: *gcmstream) void = {
 	let y: [GCMBLOCKSZ]u8 = [0...];
 	s.xorbuf[..] = s.y0[..];
 	beputu32(s.xorbuf[12..], s.y);
 	encrypt(s.block as *block, s.xorbuf, s.xorbuf);
 	s.y += 1;
 	s.xorbufpos = 0;
 };
 
 fn gcm_reader(s: *io::stream, buf: []u8) (size | io::EOF | io::error) = {
 	let s = s: *gcmstream;
 
 	const n = match (io::read(s.handle, buf)?) {
 	case io::EOF =>
 		return io::EOF;
 	case let s: size =>
 		yield s;
 	};
 
 	for (let i = n; i > 0) {
 		if (s.xorbufpos == GCMBLOCKSZ) {
 			fillxorbuf(s);
 		};
 
 		const max = if (s.xorbufpos + i > GCMBLOCKSZ) {
 			yield len(s.cipherbuf) - s.xorbufpos;
 		} else {
 			yield i;
 		};
 
 		let cipher = s.cipherbuf[s.xorbufpos..s.xorbufpos + max];
 		let key = s.xorbuf[s.xorbufpos..s.xorbufpos + max];
 
 		cipher[..] = buf[..max];
 		xor(buf[..max], buf[..max], key);
 
 		buf = buf[max..];
 		i -= max;
 
 		s.xorbufpos += max;
 		s.clen += max;
 
 		if (s.xorbufpos == len(s.cipherbuf)) {
 			ghash_ctmul64(s.tagbuf, s.h, s.cipherbuf);
 		};
 	};
 
 	return n;
 };
 
 // Finishes encryption and returns the authentication tag. After calling seal,
 // the user must not write any more data to the stream.
 export fn gcm_seal(s: *gcmstream, tag: []u8) void = {
 	assert(len(tag) == GCMTAGSZ);
 	if (s.xorbufpos > 0 && s.xorbufpos < GCMBLOCKSZ) {
 		// last block was is not full, therefore the content was not
 		// hashed yet.
 		ghash_ctmul64(s.tagbuf, s.h, s.cipherbuf[..s.xorbufpos]);
 	};
 
 	beputu64(tag, s.adlen << 3);
 	beputu64(tag[8..], s.clen << 3);
 	ghash_ctmul64(s.tagbuf, s.h, tag);
 
 	// use tmp to store the resulting tag
 	encrypt(s.block as *block, tag, s.y0);
 	xor(tag, tag, s.tagbuf);
 };
 
 // Verifies the authentication tag against the decrypted data. Must be called
 // after reading all data from the stream to ensure that the data was not
 // modified. If the data was modified, [[errors::invalid]] will be returned and
 // the data must not be trusted.
 export fn gcm_verify(s: *gcmstream, tag: []u8) (void | errors::invalid) = {
 	assert(len(tag) == GCMTAGSZ);
 	if (s.xorbufpos > 0 && s.xorbufpos < GCMBLOCKSZ) {
 		ghash_ctmul64(s.tagbuf, s.h, s.cipherbuf[..s.xorbufpos]);
 	};
 
 	let tmp: [16]u8 = [0...];
 	beputu64(tmp, s.adlen << 3);
 	beputu64(tmp[8..], s.clen << 3);
 
 	ghash_ctmul64(s.tagbuf, s.h, tmp);
 
 	encrypt(s.block as *block, tmp, s.y0);
 	xor(tmp, tmp, s.tagbuf);
 
 	if (eqslice(tag, tmp) == 0) {
 		return errors::invalid;
 	};
 };
 
 // Unlinks the 'block' provided by [[gcm_init]] to avoid finishing it when
 // calling [[io::close]] on the stream.
 export fn gcm_unlink_block(s: *gcmstream) void = {
 	s.block = null;
 };
 
 fn gcm_closer(s: *io::stream) (void | io::error) = {
 	let s = s: *gcmstream;
 	bytes::zero(s.tagbuf);
 	bytes::zero(s.xorbuf);
 	bytes::zero(s.cipherbuf);
 	bytes::zero(s.y0);
 	bytes::zero(s.h);
 
 	if (s.block is *block) {
 		finish(s.block as *block);
 	};
 };